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1. Introduction 
Reports of cases of patients suffering from an impairment of the brain function of face 
recognition have appeared in the medical literature since 1923. In some instances the cause 
is a cerebral accident, others occur in the context of a psychiatric condition. 
Those face recognition disorders associated with psychiatric diseases are called 
misidentification syndromes and may be less well known by clinicians. 
There are several syndromes, all defined by the delusional belief that familiar people or 
even the patient himself have been replaced by doubles or sosies. 
The first and most common disorder to have been described is the Capgras delusion named 
after French Professor Jean-Marie Joseph Capgras who, with his intern Jean Reboul-
Lachaux, first described this “curious little syndrome”1 as he named it (Capgras & Reboul-
Lachaux, 1923). 
1.1 Clinical interest of Capgras delusion 
Clinical studies of this pathology are justified and valuable because it is a disease that is 
stable over time, that can last for years and that is similar between patients whatever the 
context. 
Hence Capgras delusion seems to be a basic concept, a clinical entity that is found in several 
diseases, both of lesional (neurologic, iatrogenic, infectious…) or psychiatric etiology. This 
observation has given rise to numerous debates about whether Capgras delusion is a 
symptom or a syndrome, a controversy that we won’t discuss in this chapter. 
1.2 Psychopathological interest 
Understanding the abnormality in Capgras delusion could help understand the physiology 
underlying the identification and recognition of individuals by the human brain.  
In this chapter, we first clinically describe the Capgras delusion and other misidentification 
syndromes in their historic version. Then we examine the different explanatory models that 
have been reported in the scientific literature, considering psychodynamical hypotheses, 
neurocognitive and neuro-lesional theories and finally global models. 
                                                 
1 In French “un curieux petit syndrome” 
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2. Clinical description of misidentification syndromes 
2.1 Some epidemiological data 
Several classifications of psychiatric diseases have been developed because psychiatry is 
mainly a clinical science. As Capgras delusion occurs in many diseases, no standard 
definition exists for this particular entity in the current international classifications such as 
in the Diagnostic and Statistical manual of Mental disorders (APA, 1994) or the International 
Classification of diseases (WHO, 2010).  
Thus evaluating its frequency is challenging. Capgras delusion is believed to occur seldom 
(or stays unnoticed), but seems to be the most common of the misidentification syndromes 
known. 
Its prevalence varies widely across studies. Huang et al. report a prevalence of 2.5% among 
patients admitted in the psychiatric unit of the Memorial Hospital of Chang Gung in Taiwan 
between October 1994 and November 1995 (Huang et al., 1999, as cited in Henriet et al., 
2008) against 0.14% for Fischbain among patients admitted to the psychiatric emergency 
unit of the Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami during the year 1983 (Fishbain, 1987, as 
cited in Henriet et al., 2008). 
2.2 Historical description of Capgras delusion 
French Professor Jean-Marie Joseph Capgras and his intern Jean Reboul-Lachaux presented 
the original case of Mrs M. to the Clinical Society of Mental Health in Paris in 1923. He first 
termed it “l’illusion des sosies” (Capgras & Reboul-Lachaux, 1923). 
Mrs M., a 53 year old seamstress, was living in Paris with her husband and their 20 year old 
daughter. She was hospitalized in 1919 in the French psychiatric hospital Maison-Blanche 
after asking the Police to help her free the many people sequestrated in the basement of her 
house and throughout Paris. Professor Capgras reported how Mrs M. explained that she 
was the victim of a vast conspiracy of “sosies”, real people being imprisoned underground 
while their doubles act badly. 
“Her husband [...] also disappeared: a sosie took his place; she wanted to divorce this sosie; 
she drew up a complaint and requested a separation from the court. Her real husband was 
murdered and the "gentlemen" who come to visit her at the hospital are "sosies" of her 
husband; she counted at least eighty of them. [...] "If this person is my husband, she says, he 
is totally unrecognizable, he is transformed. I certify that this so-called husband that they are 
trying to foist on me in fact ceased to exist ten years ago".”2 
“To replace my stolen daughter, they always put another one who was in turn removed and 
immediately replaced ... Whenever they took away a child, they gave me another one who 
looked like her. I had over two thousand in five years [...]. Every day girls came to my home 
and every day they were taken away; I warned the Police Superintendent, saying that their 
parents had disappeared and that these girls had pricks to the face to remove all their ideas 
                                                 
2 In French “Son mari […] a également disparu : un sosie a pris sa place ; elle a voulu divorcer d’avec ce 
sosie ; elle a adressé une plainte et fait une demande de séparation au Palais. Son véritable mari a été 
assassiné et "les messieurs" qui viennent la voir sont des "sosies" de son mari ; elle en a compté au moins 
quatre-vingts. […] Si cette personne est mon mari, il est plus que méconnaissable, c’est une personne 
métamorphosée. Je certifie que le prétendant mari que l’on cherche à m’insinuer pour le mien n’existe 
plus depuis dix ans. ” 
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and that they were abused ... This coming and going of children at my house lasted from 
1914 to 1918 without interruption.”3 
“But disappearances go well beyond the family of Mrs. M., extending to her household, to 
the whole world and especially to Paris. [...] All the people who are around Mrs M. every 
day at the hospital have their sosies. [...] The head of department has been replaced by sosies 
and when asked if she is certain, she stops and then, with conviction, exclaims "The doctors 
who come here with a cloak, you can’t tell me there is only one: I know at least fifteen of 
them! "”4 
The patient herself uses the word “sosie”. The concept of the existence of doubles is the 
clinical particularity of this delusion for Capgras. 
Capgrass and Reboul-Lachaux explained the process of face recognition as a struggle 
between two feelings caused by the visual stimulus: a sense of familiarity and a sense of 
strangeness, which he compared with the mixed feelings one has when confronted with 
someone one hasn’t seen in a long time. 
In the case of Mrs. M., the sensory recognition is associated with the feeling of strangeness, 
the sense of familiarity has disappeared. Capgras believed it didn’t come from a sensory 
disorder but from a primary affective disorder with a secondary delusional interpretation 
or, as Capgras said “an emotional state first, then a habit, finally an automatic state of 
mind.”5 
2.3 Other misidentification syndromes are known 
2.3.1 Fregoli delusion 
The “syndrome d’illusion de Frégoli” was first described in 1927 by two French 
psychiatrists, Paul Courbon and Gustave Fail (Courbon & Fail, 1927, as cited in Henriet et 
al., 2008). 
In this syndrome, the patient holds the delusion that different people who have no physical 
resemblance are in fact a single person who changes appearance or is in disguise, like the 
famous Italian actor Leopoldo Fregoli (1867-1936) who was renowned for his ability to make 
quick changes of appearance during his stage act. 
In the original case, a 27 year old French woman, a servant, believed she was the victim of 
two actresses, Sarah Bernhardt and Robine, who had the capacity to take over the bodies of 
the people she met, to take her thoughts or to make her do specific acts. Her persecutors had 
                                                 
3 “Pour me remplacer ma propre fille volée, on en mettait toujours une, à son tour enlevée et remplacée 
aussitôt… Au fur et à mesure qu’ils m’enlevaient une enfant, ils m’en donnaient une autre qui lui 
ressemblait. J’en ai eu plus de deux mille en cinq ans  […] Il venait journellement des fillettes chez moi 
qui journellement m’étaient enlevées ; j’ai prévenu le Commissaire de police du quartier Necker lui 
disant que leurs parents avaient disparu et que ces fillettes avaient des piqûres à la physionomie pour 
leur enlever toute idée et qu’elles étaient maltraitées… Ce va-et-vient d’enfants chez moi a duré de 1914 
à 1918, sans discontinuer.” 
4 “Mais les disparitions débordent largement le milieu familial de Mme M., pour s’étendre à sa maison, 
au monde entier et spécialement à Paris. […] Tous les gens qui entourent journellement Mme M. à 
l’asile ont leurs sosies. […] On a remplacé le chef de service par des sosies et comme on lui demande si 
elle en est bien certaine, elle s’arrête, puis, avec conviction, s’exclame "Les docteurs qui viennent ici avec 
les pèlerines, vous ne me direz pas qu’il n’y en a qu’un : j’en connais au moins quinze ! " ” 
5 In French “un état affectif d’abord, une habitude, une tournure d’esprit ensuite” 
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the power of Fregoli and could even “fregolify” other people, meaning to put other people 
than themselves inside the bodies of relatives of the patient. 
2.3.2 Intermetamorphosis or "syndrome d'intermétamorphose et de charme" 
Soon after Capgras delusion and Fregoli syndrome, a case of “intermetamorphosis” was 
presented to the medical and psychological society meeting in Paris by Paul Courbon and 
Jean Tusques (Courbon & Tusques, 1932). 
The main symptom is the belief that the body and soul of different people are incarnated in 
the body of a single person. 
2.3.3 The syndrome of subjective doubles 
In this more recently described pathology (Christodoulou, 1978, as cited in Henriet et al., 
2008), the subject experiences the illusion that he or she has one or more doubles with the 
same physical appearance but different character traits, with each double leading a life of its 
own. 
2.4 What misidentification syndromes have in common (Weinstein, 1994, as cited in 
Henriet, 2003) 
A first common trait is the belief in duplication of people. Each patient suffering from one of 
these syndromes has the idea that multiple versions of people can exist at the same moment 
(but not at the same place). 
This illusion of substitution comes from an agnosia of identification: the impersonator is 
physically identical (i.e. physically recognized) but psychologically different (the sense of 
familiarity that should accompany the visual recognition has disappeared). 
The impersonator uses his resemblance with the real person to persecute the patient; he is 
always ill intentioned. 
The person replaced isn’t chosen at random. In most cases the person is emotionally related 
to the patient, by attraction or repulsion. 
Finally, in every case, the fate of the « original » person seems quite unimportant: he or she 
may have disappeared, been kidnapped, confined, murdered… The explanations are often 
poor and evasive, given with little emotion. 
2.5 Their differences according to the literature 
To work on these syndromes, authors tried to classify them according to their differences, 
suggesting that the psychopathology processes could be different. 
For Jacques Vié in 1930, all of the misidentification syndromes are a single disease that he 
calls “syndrome des sosies” and that can take two forms: a positive and a negative form. In 
the first category, the patient finds imaginary resemblances between people; Vié in this case 
describes the sosies as “positive”, as in Fregoli delusion or intermetamorphosis.  In the 
second category, the person denies the identity of his relative, discovering tiny differences 
between the “original” person and his sosie, creating a “negative” double. Capgras delusion 
or the syndrome of subjective doubles are examples of the negative form of syndrome des 
sosies (Vié, 1930). 
Georgios Christodoulou in 1977 proposed the same kind of classification, distinguishing 
hypo-identification from hyper-identification syndromes (Christodoulou, 1977, as cited in 
Henriet, 2003). Some specific facial recognition tests could differentiate between these two 
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sub-groups of patients suggesting that the facial recognition process is altered in different 
ways in the two groups (Walther et al., 2010). 
Oyebode in 1996 identified patients who recognize familiar faces (Capgras), and patients 
who recognize unfamiliar faces (Frégoli). According to this author, this distinction could 
mean that these two syndromes come from two different anatomical lesions, considering 
that the recognition process for familiar faces would be located in the right temporal lobe 
whereas for unfamiliar faces the right parietal lobe would be implicated (Oyebode et al., 
1996, as cited in Henriet, 2003). 
2.6 These clinical entities are found in several pathologies 
Capgras delusion can be associated with organic diseases like epilepsy, stroke, iatrogenic 
pathologies or infectious diseases. Capgras delusion seems to be mostly found coupled with 
psychiatric disorders, mainly paranoid schizophrenia, but also mood or schizoaffective 
disorders. 
A case of isolated Capgras was described by Henriet et al. in 2006. A 59 year old woman 
believed her husband and daughter were replaced by evil sosies. The paraclinical test results 
(blood test, electroencephalogram, cerebral scan, single photon emission computed 
tomography, intellectual efficiency) were normal, showing no neurological disease. The 
psychiatric exam didn’t reveal any schizophrenia, chronic hallucinatory psychosis, paranoid 
psychosis or mood disorder. She had a similar episode four years earlier and recovered 
without treatment at the time, keeping her social and professional position. 
2.4 Differential diagnosis 
The “recognitions” in Capgras delusion are different from false recognitions which are 
defined by the recognition of an unknown person. Patients with false recognitions perceive 
face similarities when there aren’t any whereas patients with Capgras detect tiny details to 
justify their denial of the identity of the person. 
Capgras is not a memory disorder because the patient doesn’t have any trouble 
remembering the faces of the people whose identity he denies. 
Capgras differs also from prosopagnosia. The latter is the inability to recognize faces of 
familiar people by sight (but the person can be recognized by his or her voice, glasses, 
mustache…), but is not accompanied by the mention of the existence of sosies or by 
persecutory delusional experiences. 
The symptoms of paramnesia of reduplication look like Capgras delusion because the 
patient holds the delusional belief that a place or a person familiar to him has been 
duplicated, but there isn’t any notion of substitution or imposture. 
3. Explanatory models of face recognition 
Three categories of models have been considered in the scientific literature. Psychodynamic 
theories inspired by psychoanalysis were initially preferred given the selective nature and 
the emotional value of the sosified person (most of the time a family member, or the 
patient’s caregiver).  
Neuro-lesional models have been developed starting from the 1960s with the objective of 
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More recently the development of cognitive neuropsychology offered a different approach 
based on models of the face processing function, trying to discover not the brain structure 
responsible for the dysfunction, but the cognitive operation deficiency. 
3.1 Psychodynamic models 
These models were mainly developed at the time of the first description in 1923, 
approximately when Sigmund Freud was elaborating his psychoanalytic theories, in 
particular in his book “The Uncanny” (“Das Unheimliche”) where he discusses the concept 
of the “double” (Freud, 1919, as cited in Henriet, 2003). 
The first theory is the hypothesis of depersonalization where the notion of sosie would be 
due to the projection by the patient of his own “Uncanny” on others. The patient finds it 
easier to believe that others have changed rather than himself. Hence the impression of “not 
being oneself” becomes the impression of others “not being themselves”, having been 
replaced by sosies. 
The most widely accepted psychodynamic theory currently is the hypothesis that Capgras 
delusion is a psychotic solution to the problem of ambivalence. 
The definition of ambivalence in psychoanalysis is the fact of having simultaneously 
contradictory feelings toward a person, usually love and hate. The defense mechanism used 
to cope with these conflicting feelings depends on personality.  
For patients suffering from Capgras delusion, the defense mechanism used to cope with the 
split between the feeling of hate and the feeling of love would be the idea of the existence of 
two persons: a bad one, the sosie, considered as an impostor and a persecutor, and a good 
one, the “original” person. This theory allows the patient to continue loving his or her 
relative while expressing his or her hate of the sosie without any feeling of guilt.  
Capgras delusion is also believed to result from early relational disturbances, or a childhood 
trauma causing a loss of confidence in the reality of the objective world or even an attempt 
to overcome a poorly repressed Oedipius complex. 
Jean-Marie Joseph Capgras’ own etiological hypothesis is a primary affective disorder 
because of the simultaneous feelings of familiarity and strangeness. He explained that the 
belief in sosies is the intellectual conclusion of disturbed feelings. 
3.2 Psychometrics 
Neuropsychological tests are based on the concept of the human face as a specific 
recognition object. Thus the human face is seen as a geometric figure that changes with 
age, mood, health status, presence of accessories (glasses, make-up …) or expressed 
emotions. 
Psychometric tests use match-to sample, discrimination or naming of human faces which 
differ in the viewing  angle, the sex, the age, the expressed emotion, the pose, the features... 
For instance, the Benton Face Recognition Test (Benton & Van Allen, 1968 as cited in Vanier, 
1991) evaluates face identification skills by matching pictures of non familiar faces 
presenting differences in the lighting or the viewing angle. The Bruyer and Schweich face 
recognition battery uses a famous faces discrimination task and identification subtests of 
features independent of the expression (Bruyer & Schweich, 1991). Familiarity can also be 
experimentally induced before the tests with repeated exposure to a face.  
Neuropsychological models have been developed based on the test errors observed in 
Capgras delusion and prosopagnosia patients. 
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3.2.1 Bruce and Young’s sequential model  
Bruce and Young imagined a three step model of face recognition that progresses in a 
particular order (Bruce & Young, 1986, as cited in Ellis, 2004). 
The first step is the encoding (i.e the conversion of the stimulus to information that can be 
stored in memory) of general physical characteristics such as age, sex or skin color and of 
physiognomic characteristics that are unique to this face. 
The next step is the comparison of this information with the memory stock of familiar 
people (composed of different Face Recognition Units or FRU), producing or not the feeling 
of familiarity. 
If the face is familiar, the final step consists of the stimulation by the FRU of the Person 
Identity Node (or PIN) containing the relevant semantic and biographical information. 
In Capgras delusion, the third step would be disturbed resulting in a dysfunction of the 
access to the sosified person’s PIN, the recognition of his face (steps 1 and 2) being 
preserved but not his identification. The familiar face activates the information related to the 
imaginary persecutor and not those of the real person. 
 
.  
Fig. 1. A simplified version of Bruce & Young’s sequential model. A familiar face activates 
the corresponding Face Recognition Unit (FRU), then the Personal Identity Node (PIN), 
finally the Name Retrieval Module (Bruce & Young, 1986, as cited in Ellis, 2004). 
  My name is 
Sophie 
My name is 
Gaspard 
Stimulus Encoding 
FRU FRU FRU 
   
   
Unknown 
person 
PIN PIN PIN 
Sophie Gaston Patrick 
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This sequential model is currently supplanted by a serial model which better accounts for 
Capgras delusion. 
3.2.2 The two-route model of face recognition has become a widely accepted 
hypothesis  
Bauer suggested another model, based on the observed emotional reactivity caused by a face 
in prosopagnosic patients (Bauer, 1984, 1986, as cited in Breen et al., 2000). He assumed that 
emotional reactivity could be measured by “skin conductance response” (which varies with 
the skin’s sweating level), and that a change in this parameter would represent an 
unconscious recognition of the face. In prosopagnosia, a change in the patient’s skin 
conductance response appears when he is confronted with a familiar face, but he isn’t 
capable of consciously recognizing his relative. Bauer concluded that there are two parallel 
pathways, instead of one in the first model, connecting the visual cortex to the limbic system 
(an association of cerebral areas believed to support emotion, behavior, and memory skills).  
The first is an overt ventral route via the inferior temporal lobe which makes it possible to 
recognize consciously and explicitly the identity of the observed face. 
The second is the covert dorsal route going via the superior temporal sulcus and the inferior 
parietal lobule which is responsible for the affective and unconscious recognition of the face. 
In a 1990 paper published in the British Journal of Psychiatry, psychologists Ellis and 
Young, considering Bauer’s model, suggested that Capgras delusion could result from a 
dysfunction of the dorsal route with an intact ventral route (Ellis & Young, 1990, as cited in 
Henriet et al., 2008). 
In the case of patients with Capgras delusion, the Ellis and Young hypothesis was confirmed 
with the observation of a deficit in emotional reactivity while the conscious awareness of 
recognition is preserved (Hirstein & Ramachandran, 1997). The patient physically 
recognizes his relative’s face but doesn’t have the affective confirmation of this recognition. 
Faced with this conflicting information, he calls upon rationalization and concludes that 
there must be a sosie of his relative. The authors emphasized the fact that the face 
recognition deficit in Capgras delusion is selective to the visual domain. Indeed some 
patients remain capable of recognizing their sosified relative by his voice.  
Ellis and Young also hypothesized Capgras delusion could be the “mirror” of 
prosopagnosia. In Bauer’s model, prosopagnosia would represent an interruption in the 
overt route, whereas Capgras delusion would result from an impairment of the covert 
pathway. 
3.2.3 Breen’s serial model  
Breen et al. proposed in 2000 a bidirectional cognitive model of face processing based on 
Bauer’s model. They state that there isn’t any evidence supporting the theory of two 
anatomical regions responsible for face recognition. Thus they claim that the visual-limbic 
ventral route described by Bauer is the sole face processing area of the human brain. 
They argue that within this area there are two functional pathways from the Face 
Recognition Unit, one leading to the related Personal Identity Node, the other to an 
“affective response to familiar stimuli” module. The two pathways are independent. 
According to the authors, Capgras delusion would be the outcome of a lesion or a 
dysfunction in the access to the additional module, whereas prosopagnosia would be the 
result of a dysfunction in the FRU or in the access to the associated PIN. 
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Fig. 2. A simplified version of Breen’s serial model based on Bauer’s theory. Two 
independent cognitive pathways leading to the person’s identification but one anatomical 




































Fig. 3. An adapted version of the Ellis and Lewis model model. The Personal Identity Node 
(PIN) and the affective response module are connected by an integrative device (Ellis & 
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3.2.4 Ellis and Lewis add a step to Breen’s model  
They suggest that the information coming from the recognition system and the affective 
response system are re-integrated to be matched with the memorized face (Ellis & Lewis, 
2001, as cited in Henriet, 2003). This processing would take place in an “integrative device”. 
Capgras delusion would appear if the face is recognized but the familiarity response is not 
confirmed.  
3.3 Neuro-lesional models 
Neuro-lesional models of Capgras delusion were developed after cases of Capgras delusion  
associated with organic diseases and not just psychiatric conditions were described, for 
instance with migraine or cerebral localization of human immunodeficiency virus. New 
paraclinical tests have also become available, especially neuro-imaging techniques. 
Cases of prosopagnosia have been widely studied to understand the anatomical support of 
face recognition. Results have been extrapolated to account for Capgras delusion. 
3.3.1 A right hemisphere dysfunction 
Ellis in 1994 suggested that Capgras delusion results from a right hemisphere dysfunction 
based on two arguments (Ellis, 1994, as cited in Henriet, 2003). 
The first argument was that schizophrenia is due to a right hemisphere dysfunction 
(Cutting, 1985, as cited in Henriet, 2003), a hypothesis that is currently widely criticized. 
The second argument was based on a literature review (Feinberg & Shapiro, 1989, as cited in 
Henriet, 2003) which demonstrated that the majority of patients with Capgras delusion 
associated with brain abnormalities (they listed 26 patients in this situation in the literature) 
had bilateral lesions. If lesions were unilateral (the case for 8 among the 26 patients), the 
lesions were most often in the right hemisphere. 
His hypothesis was supported by cognitive neuropsychological data from his 1993 study 
where he presented two images of faces in the right or the left visual hemi-field to a group 
of 3 patients with Capgras delusion and to a control group of 3 patients diagnosed with 
schizophrenia (Ellis et al., 1993, as cited in Henriet et al., 2008). The subjects had to 
determine whether the two faces were identical or different, and their answer was timed. He 
postulated that “normal” subjects would react faster when the images are presented in the 
left side of their visual field, because the right cerebral hemisphere would process the 
stimulus faster than the left one. The results in the Capgras delusion group showed no 
difference between the two hemi-fields, whereas the answer was faster in the left hemi-field 
for the schizophrenia group. Ellis’s conclusion, aside from contradicting Cutting’s theory 
about schizophrenia, was that the face processing deficit in Capgras delusion is located in 
the right hemisphere. 
3.3.2 Gobbini and Haxby incorporate neuro-imaging data within neuropsychological 
models (Gobbini & Haxby, 2007) 
Recently, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have found anatomic 
regions giving rise to face-related activity in the right hemisphere. An association of two 
cortical networks, a core and an extended one, are believed to be in charge of the different 
functions implicated in face recognition. 
The core system could be composed of separate anatomical regions, like the lateral portion 
of the mid-fusiform gyrus or “fusiform face area” or FFA which has been discovered 
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bilaterally but predominantly in the right hemisphere (Kanwisher et al., 1997, as cited in 
Gobbini & Haxby, 2007). Other occipito-temporal areas are supposed to be part of this 
network, such as regions in the inferior occipital gyrus (or occipital face area or OFA) or the 
superior temporal sulcus (or STS) (Haxby et al., 2000, as cited in Gobbini & Haxby, 2007). 
This core face processing network could be further connected to an extended network for 
which the anatomical substrate has not been yet completely discovered, contrary to the core 
system. 
Using Breen’s neuropsychology model, the authors assume that the core system is 
responsible for the perception stage of face processing and the extended network for the 
memory operations of facial processing. The PINs are believed to be located in this extended 
network.  
Given the anatomical segregation of these processes, damage can either appear in the 
specific regions or in their connections, and create various symptoms depending on where 
they occur. This hypothesis could support the fact that diverse lesions can lead to similar 
deficits, explaining the multiplicity of lesions found in neurologic Capgras delusion. 
3.3.3 “Right brain lesions and left brain delusions” 
Hirstein & Ramachandran in 1997, then Devinsky in 2009 postulate that Capgras delusion 
(and misidentification syndromes in general), when associated with a neurologic disease, is 
due to frontal lobes and/or right hemisphere dysfunction while specific (but unknown) left 
brain areas are preserved. 
Right hemisphere lesions would be responsible for errors in emotions related to face stimuli 
and self-monitoring. Left preserved areas then “unleash a creative narrator” from these 
erroneous data and, since the cognitive method of classification of the left hemisphere is 
often binary, the patient with Capgras delusion imagines two different people instead of 
one. 
3.3.4 Conclusion about neuro-lesional models in Capgras delusion 
The paraclinical data are scarce and Capgras delusion rarely diagnosed. The explanatory 
models are mainly based upon prosopagnosics or neurologic Capgras. Hence it seems 
difficult at present to formally conclude that an anatomical lesion alone is responsible for 
Capgras delusion.  
In addition, these theories cannot account for cases of Capgras delusion associated with 
psychiatric diseases where no cerebral abnormality is found, and certainly not for the case of 
isolated Capgras delusion described above. 
The Gobbini and Haxby’s model integrates paraclinical observations in neuropsychological 
models, opening the path to other propositions of global theories for Capgras delusion. 
3.4 Global approach to Capgras delusion 
The model of Capgras delusion based on Bauer’s two-route theory seems confirmed by 
anatomical data and by neuropsychological explanations, supporting global hypotheses for 
the development of Capgras delusion. 
Henriet in 2003 has proposed a global model integrating psychodynamic, organic and 
functional theories. 
The first step in the development of Capgras delusion would be a functional 
neuropsychological deficit sometimes but not always due to organic lesions. 
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The patient would need to have a specific personality with “paranoid” traits and defense 
mechanisms such as projection or interpretation where this functional deficit would appear. 
All these phenomena lead to a secondary delusional rationalization, producing the 
symptoms of Capgras delusion. 
4. Conclusion 
The cleavage between organic and functional etiology is currently outdated and denied. 
Capgras delusion seems to be a transnosographic entity, which starts as a lesional or 
functional impairment, and then manifests as a psychiatric disorder. 
Research in this area shows that cerebral face recognition processing is complex and not 
currently fully understood. Face recognition depends on a combination of anatomical 
structures, cognitive functions and psychopathological processing. Global approaches must 
be used to explore its dysfunction and function. 
It is important to emphasize that, beside its scientific interest this syndrome remains a real 
source of pain for patients and their caretakers. 
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